



ISRAELI “JUDAIZATION” POLICY IN GALILEE

GHAZI FALAH

The struggle for Palestine has always been a struggle over land—land as space, and land as resource. This struggle continues, not only in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, but even within the “green line”—the pre-June 1967 borders of the Israeli state—in areas of significant Arab population. The means through which the Israeli government wages this struggle is the policy of Judaization, which aims at achieving a demographic balance in favor of the Jewish population through so-called “regional planning,” and more specifically through the contrasting processes of dispersing new Jewish settlements while at the same time controlling the physical expansion of Palestinian villages. The present paper focuses on the policy of Judaization in the Galilee, where Palestinian Arab population continues, despite all efforts to the contrary, to form a significant majority.

Nearly all Israeli geographers and planners who have dealt with the policy of Judaization have expressed concern that the local Palestinian population endangers the territorial integrity of the state because of its concentration within a region originally assigned to the proposed Arab state under the 1947 UN Partition Plan.¹ In 1978, the Israeli government explicitly alluded to this argument in a proposal promoting policies aimed at changing geographical

Ghazi Falah is Executive Director of the Galilee Center for Social Research, Nazareth, and the author of *The Forgotten Palestinians: Arab An-Naqab, 1906-86*, (Tayiba, 1989). This article is based on an earlier article that appeared in *Political Geography Quarterly* 8, no. 3, July 1989, and is part of a series of articles growing out of a project investigating urbanization of Arab settlements in Galilee, funded by the Ford Foundation, New York.

realities, as follows:

In respect to the demographic situation, it should be borne in mind that one is talking about a region where, in accordance with the 1947 UN decision on the partition of Eretz Israel into two states, the greater part [of mountainous Galilee] was contained within the Arab state. That state is today at the top of the list of the demands of the Arab nations in the name of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" (in a clear reference to the aforementioned UN decision) . . .²

Such notions have had, and continue to have, a powerful impact on the thinking of decisionmakers and planners, imposing a military and strategic dimension on regional planning. Thus, in geopolitical terms, the Judaization of the Galilee functions as a tool to maintain full state sovereignty over the area while at the same time preventing the creation of an Arab "core area" which could eventually lead to the formation of an independent Palestinian state within Israel.

The Arab Population in Galilee

The 622,900 Palestinians in Israel in 1986 (excluding the populations of the annexed areas of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) constitute some 15 percent of the total population of the state, inhabiting three geographically distinct and separate areas, namely the Galilee, the "Little Triangle" north-east of greater Tel Aviv, and the Negev. The Galilee lies within the Northern District, where some 56 percent of Israel's total Arab population lives.

In discussing the ratio of the Arab to Jewish population in various regions, Israeli commentators use statistics for the Northern District *as a whole*, where the Palestinian population comes to just under 50 percent. But it is important to note that the Galilee constitutes less than half of the total area of the Northern District, which includes, among other regions, part of the Beisan Valley and the Roha Hills, which are geographically quite distinct. For this reason, use of statistical data for the entire Northern District when discussing the composition of the population is highly misleading: D. Newman has noted clearly that "the politically desired population balance . . . has been maintained *only* by including in the official statistics the coastal Jewish population to the west and the Hulah Valley settlements to the east. Even so, the Jewish majority was only 51.7 percent in 1980."³

In fact, taking only the natural areas associated directly with Galilee proper, one finds an Arab population of 270,300 in 1986, or *73 percent of the total population*; this dominant majority has been maintained despite the mass exodus of Palestinians from Galilee during the 1948 war and despite the concerted efforts of successive Israeli governments to encourage Jewish urban and rural settlement in the area (see figure 1). One would surmise that the misleading 50 percent figure is cited for reasons of state policy: by giving the impression that the Palestinians are "about to become" a majority—that the "imminent demographic danger" to which the government alludes is about to be realized (at which point the Arabs might push for "territorial indepen-

dence”)—immediate further measures aimed at land expropriation and planning for Jewish settlement seem justified.




Figure 1. Distribution of Arab Population in Northern District, 1986, by Natural Region

The Three Stages of Judaization in Galilee

The distinctive pattern of Arab concentration in Galilee, with the greatest

density in the geographical center of the region and decreasing densities as one moves into the surrounding natural regions, suggests that the classic model of core-periphery lends itself well to an analysis of population distribution in the region.

This pattern has significantly shaped regional policy and settlement strategy, which can be divided into three stages over the forty-odd years since the 1948 war. In a *first stage*, the aim was to fill the “vacuum” left by the demolition of Palestinian villages during the 1948 war and its aftermath (notably in border areas), and to create a belt of Jewish settlements surrounding the remaining Palestinian villages and lands. The *second stage* involved penetrating the “core” of greatest Palestinian population concentration through the implantation of new Jewish settlements, mainly small “lookout settlements” (*mitzpim*). This served to create further spatial fragmentation and discontinuity of Palestinian lands and villages. Since these efforts did not succeed in altering the relative demographic composition, it appears that a *third stage* was initiated after 1982 involving an attempt, on a microgeographical level, to intervene in the economy and spatial expansion of individual Palestinian villages. Among other things, this involved introducing new jurisdictional boundaries to control and hem in the economic development of these villages while strengthening new Jewish economic foci so as to dominate the economic life of the region.

The First Stage, 1948-74

This stage can be divided into two phases. The first was the de-Arabization of the region,⁴ particularly in the wake of two Zionist military campaigns launched on 11 May 1948 and 29 October 1948, which resulted in the occupation of the entire Northern District and the abrupt reduction of the Palestinian population by about 56 percent. Simultaneously, there was an apparent 35 percent increase in the Jewish population of the district.⁵ The de-Arabization of northern Palestine was most notable among the urban population, as shown in the table below. Nazareth remained the largest Arab population center not only in the region but in all Israel, despite the fact that 20 percent of its former population had left or was expelled during the war.⁶ The pattern of destruction of the villages has been analyzed elsewhere,⁷ but most of the demolished villages fell within the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the Partition Plan, leaving intact many of those situated in the part originally allotted to the proposed Arab state.

The second phase of this stage involved the creation of some 117 new Jewish settlements, particularly rural, to fill the “vacuum” created as a result of the war.⁸ This settlement was carried out both to absorb as quickly as possible the influx of Jewish immigrants and to create a *fait accompli* that would prevent the return of the former inhabitants who had either been expelled from the new state altogether or were “homeland refugees” inside the armistice lines.⁹

Table 1. The urban Arab population in northern Palestine/Israel, 1945 and 1951¹⁰

	1945	1951
Haifa	62,800	7,500
Nazareth	14,200	20,300
Acre	12,310	4,220
Shafa 'Amr	3,630	4,450
Beisan	5,180	-
Safad	9,530	-
Tiberias	5,310	-
Total	112,960	36,470

Figure 2 shows the distinctive pattern of settlements in Galilee at the end of this stage. The establishment of new rural settlements along the northern border to "secure" the area was accompanied by a strategy of destroying and transferring most of the Palestinian villages that had remained there.¹¹ Some 17 villages were declared "closed areas" and their populations either deported or taken to other still existing Arab villages.¹² The Palestinian villages in the inner area that had survived the war were thus surrounded on all sides by a belt of Jewish settlements that acted as barriers separating them both from the remaining Arab villages in Israel and from the Arab populations of the neighboring states. At the same time, the entire Galilee was placed under military rule until 1966. These security measures eventually had a crucial effect on the urbanization processes that began to evolve in the region, as will be discussed below.

Meanwhile, the policy of land expropriations, especially of arable farmland, was affecting large numbers of Palestinian villages.¹³ The land transfers aimed at strengthening the economic base of the new Jewish settlements to which lands were allocated, while at the same time Arab use of land was further limited by the declaration of "closed areas" to which Palestinian farmers were barred access. Numerous tracts of arable and pasture land were also expropriated to be turned into "forest areas" under the control of the Jewish National Fund, a kind of "retreat" in the development of the agricultural landscape.

This period also witnessed the beginning of the urbanization process that was to characterize the Palestinian villages in Galilee: at present 68 percent of the Palestinian inhabitants of the Galilee live in what are officially termed "urbanized villages"—villages with 5,000 or more inhabitants, over half of whom are not employed in agriculture. Two main factors played a role in this urbanization. First was the lack of any clear Israeli planning policy towards the Palestinians within the state. This resulted in so-called "unplanned and illegal" residential construction in and around Palestinian villages under the pressures of natural population growth.

Second, and probably more important, was the military rule imposed upon the entire Arab (not Jewish) population from 1948 until 1966,¹⁴ under which the authorities controlled the movement of Palestinians including access to




Figure 2. Rural Settlement in Galilee, 1974

urban areas for purposes of work. Especially during the first decade of military rule, permits to work in urban Jewish centers were seldom granted; the Palestinians were thus virtually confined to their villages for almost 18 years.

One result of the consequent curtailment of capital accumulation and restricted contact with surrounding areas was that urbanization trends generally associated with economic development and industrialization in the Middle East and third world—notably migration to the cities—were delayed or forestalled.¹⁵ Thus, military rule was responsible for what Meyer-Brodnitz has described as “latent urbanization”:¹⁶ the Palestinian population underwent urbanization in their home villages, developing close ties and strong infrastructures locally to the point that even when military rule was lifted in 1966 most of the inhabitants remained. This was particularly true for the landless “internal” refugees who had been expelled from various Galilee villages around 1948 and resettled in other Arab localities in the region, and who appeared even less inclined to uproot themselves once again and migrate to urban centers.

These “relocated” refugees contributed significantly to the overall size of the villages, sometimes constituting close to 50 percent of the population. They were also responsible for another phenomenon accompanying the new urbanization, since they tended to band together with other refugees from the same locality and form entirely separate neighborhoods at the peripheries of the host village. Meanwhile, under the pressures of population growth (the natural demographic growth rate among the Palestinians in Israel peaked during this period—in 1965—at 44.6 per 1,000, one of the highest in the world) the villages continued to expand outward, engulfing the outlying refugee neighborhoods and filling in the lands between them with new construction. The result was the creation of a large built-up sprawl over the area of village land.

The state authorities initially did nothing to stop this phenomenon, since it was in their interests that the refugees become assimilated in their new villages so as to weaken their claims to their original and now generally demolished villages. In a number of instances, the authorities even granted formal construction permits. Later, however, they began to see this expansion as a negative development, particularly since territorial connections—undesirable for the policy of Judaization—were forming between neighboring villages. Zonal planning was then introduced, and these connecting areas were officially declared off limits to residential construction.

Another characteristic feature of the urbanized Palestinian villages of Israel became clear during this period: the decline in the number of Palestinian farmers as a result of land expropriations and other Judaization measures, and their transformation into wage-earners.¹⁷ This pattern of urbanization, closely linked with the creation of a burgeoning landless proletariat, continued to be pursued as government policy, particularly during the second and third stages of Judaization.

The Second Stage, 1974-82

Substantial penetration into the “core” Palestinian area of central Galilee, the principal task of the second stage, had its beginnings during the first stage with the establishment on expropriated Palestinian lands of three Jewish “development towns”—Maalot, Upper Nazareth, and Karmiel, the first two in 1957, the third in 1965—with the aim of disrupting the territorial continuity of the Arab villages and acting as barriers to their physical expansion.

But this policy promoting territorial control was most pronounced during the second stage, when Israel set out to rectify the “asymmetric” situation in land use and land holdings through the establishment of Jewish rural settlements and through a new “accelerated urban strategy” for Galilee, proposed by the Ministry of Housing in 1977. According to this last, all possible resources were to be mobilized for the massive development of the three towns of Karmiel, Upper Nazareth, and Safad, an exclusively Jewish town since the mass expulsions of 1948.¹⁸ A total of 6,320 dunams were expropriated from local Palestinians for accelerating urban development in Upper Nazareth and Karmiel. As the policy of de-Arabization of the old town of Acre proceeded, 734 dunams from the Arab village of Makr were expropriated to “resettle” Arab families from Acre. These expropriations were protested in a massive general strike on 30 March 1976 during which six Palestinians were killed by Israeli border guard units, an event that has since been commemorated annually by Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories as “Land Day.”

Previously, in June 1974, the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency had proposed a rural settlement strategy for penetration into the inner core of Galilee. The goal was to increase the Jewish population in the Galilee mountains from 62,000 in 1973 to 100,000 by 1980,¹⁹ thereby creating an alternative Jewish core within the territory of the existing Palestinian Arab core while at the same time isolating clusters of Palestinian villages from each other. By mid-1981, 58 rural Jewish settlements had been created, 28 of them within three new settlement blocs—Segev, Tefen, and Tsalmon (see figure 3). The blocs had communication linkages among themselves as well as to urban Jewish settlements inside and outside the Galilee, with the intention of creating a continuous territorial belt while forming a physical barrier separating the major Palestinian concentrations in the region. A number of new roads have since been built linking the three major blocs and the main road system in Galilee. According to one source, some 80 kilometers of new paved roads were built by the Jewish National Fund by 1980.²⁰

The Tefen bloc, containing six settlements on 36,000 dunams, serves as a wedge to separate three Palestinian population concentrations: the Tarshiha and Yasif group of villages in the north and west, and the Shaghur group of villages in the south and east. It also cuts the territorial extension of the lands of Julis, Yirka, Jatt, Yanuh, and Tarshiha and the lands of Majd al Kurum, el Bi’na, Dayr el Asad, Kisra, and Kafr Sumei.

The Segev bloc, planned to encompass 12 to 14 new Jewish settlements on




Figure 3. Jewish Settlement Strategy in Galilee, 1974-1980, in Relation to Arab Settlements

30,000 dunams, separates the villages of the Shafa Amr group in the west and the Sakhnin and Shaghur groups in the east and north. It also forms a barrier between the lands, and even the residential areas, of the villages of I'billin and Dhumidah to the south, and Tamra, Kabul, and Sha'b to the west, Majd al Kurum to the north, and Kaukab, Dahra, and Sakhnin to the east.

The Tsalmon bloc, covering 38,000 dunams, contains 13 settlements and forms a link between the settlements of the other two new blocs and the older Jewish settlements north of Lake Tiberias. Moreover, the two western "panhandles" of the bloc combined with the two Jewish "lookout settlements" of Kamon and Makmonim to the west effectively surround the Arab villages of Maghar and the Bedouin villages of Sawaid, Muraisat, and Hamdun and cut them off from the two major Arab concentrations in the area—the villages of Eilabun, Dayr Hanna, Arrab, and Sakhnin to the south, and the Shaghur villages on the Acre-Safad road to the north.

Another dimension of physical control was the creation of tiny "lookout settlements" (*mitzpe*, pl. *mitzpim*) on mountain tops, each comprising six to twenty families. Such mini-settlements, for which vast sums of money were expended,²¹ served to lay claim to the lands in the immediate area for more permanent settlements in the future,²² involving the "fencing in of areas meant for future settlement so as to prevent the illegal seizure of state lands."²³ Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of isolating Palestinian villages by the three major settlement blocs.

Yet after ten years of implementation of the second stage of the Judaization policy, it was realized that neither the accelerated urban strategy nor the rural policy had been successful. Kipnis has concluded that "all attempts to arrive at a substantial demographic balance have, however, been unsuccessful. . . . In all target years the Arab population was larger than expected and the Jewish population was less than had been anticipated."²⁴ More specifically, the lookout settlements' effectiveness has been questioned by many Israeli scholars. The target population set for these settlements had been 6,000,²⁵ but by the year 1984 the total had not even reached 2,500.²⁶ Moreover, while they had been established for the express purpose of "keeping an eye" on the surrounding areas, the settlers were often not even present, commuting to the Haifa metropolitan area for work because of the lack of an adequate economic infrastructure in the new settlements.

While the authorities were engaged in setting up new Jewish settlements, they were simultaneously pursuing strict regional planning measures aimed at controlling the physical expansion, or spatial growth, of Arab villages. These measures reached their fruition in the third stage in the form of active intervention, but during this period they involved nonaction; more specifically, the efforts to curb Palestinian development centered on the Ministry of the Interior's policy of *not* authorizing zoning plans or "master plans" for Palestinian villages—a master plan being defined as "a binding legal document which regulates the assignment of land for various purposes in the area covered by the plan."²⁷

A delay in authorizing or the refusal to authorize such plans *as a policy* directly influences the process of urbanization in Palestinian villages, because the absence of approved master plans, at least theoretically, gives the authorities considerable legal freedom to control both the development and the economy of any given village, not only by declining to grant permits to establish factories but also because they can refuse to allocate a budget for infrastructure.²⁸ Indicative of state policy in this regard is that as of 1980, only 18 Arab villages out of a total of 105 examined by state investigators had master plans that were approved,²⁹ while in Central Galilee, only two of the 23 villages examined had approved master plans.³⁰

The Judaization policy has imposed economic and institutional constraints on the Palestinian population in order to condition their dependency on the Jewish-dominated economy and institutions.³¹ Little effort is made to conceal these objectives: the Ministry of Housing's plan for "induced" or "accelerated" urban development in Galilee clearly states: "It is impossible and also undesirable to develop extended industrial areas within the territory of the village."³² Pursuit of such policies amounts to maintaining "latent urbanization" without any suitable economic infrastructure in the village. One result of this was the need for Palestinians to commute to work in Jewish urban centers and towns outside Galilee, which was to become a clear and distinct policy in the third stage of Judaization.

The Third Stage, Post-1982

It is difficult to determine the precise starting point for the third stage of Judaization, the main thrust of which is economic control and domination of the region's natural resources. Not only had these been objectives before 1982, but the time period for the Judaization "transactions" has been too brief to reveal clearly many of its "spatial attributes."³³ Nevertheless, after 1982 there seems to have been a major turning point in the policy of Judaization, namely direct intervention in the economic life and spatial expansion of the Palestinian villages in the region. In 1977, the Ministry of Housing recognized that the previous policy of "nondecision" and "nonplanning" for Palestinian villages could not be continued if Judaization were to succeed:

The lack of a proper solution to the needs of the population in the Arab sector, which would take into account the panoply of social, economic and spatial tendencies manifested in Arab society, is likely to lead to the failure of every development effort aimed solely at the Jewish sector.³⁴

The general action strategies of this third stage suggest that the Judaization policy is now shifting from the macrolevel of the region as a whole to the microlevel of the single Palestinian Arab settlement. This shift is reflected in two actions: the establishment of the Misgav Regional Council in the heart of Galilee in October 1982,³⁵ and the appointment in 1985 of a top level inter-ministerial commission on "illegal construction in the Arab sector," the Markovitz Committee.

The Misgav Regional Council was established ostensibly to provide serv-

ices and to create a regional network for the 21 Jewish settlements of the Segev bloc and the 4 settlements of the Tefen bloc.³⁶ In fact, however, the move had important ramifications for the Palestinians of the region, for it placed their lands under the formal jurisdiction of the Council, which now controls all natural resources and all development matters pertaining to agriculture and grazing in the area under its jurisdiction. The creation of the Council thus achieved two interrelated aims. First, it removed Arab-owned lands from the "sphere of influence" of the Arab villages, weakening their economic infrastructure and thus encouraging the people to seek employment as laborers in Jewish towns and urban centers outside Galilee. (Though Arabs can still cultivate their lands, they are highly restricted in their options for developing them, as permits are required from the new regional authority.) Second, it preserved as the prerogative of the Jewish settlers the use and development of natural resources in the region, thereby strengthening the Jewish economic base and reducing the need to commute to work in towns outside Galilee.

The placing of 180,000 dunams under the "jurisdictional control" of some 2,000 Jewish settlers (i.e., about 90 dunams per person) has generated a great deal of protest from the 23 Arab villages (total population of 129,872 according to the 1983 census) the lands of which constitute about half of those placed under the Regional Council's jurisdiction. By removing the development of these lands from Palestinian control, the policy clearly makes the Arab economy increasingly dependent on the Israeli-Jewish market. Moreover, Jews can develop lands under such jurisdiction for recreational or touristic purposes, or for grazing or intensive animal husbandry. It is thus possible to characterize such a policy as being highly conducive to further de-Arabization of the land.

A second aim of government strategy during this period—above and beyond securing control of the land—involves limiting the spatial expansion of Palestinian villages and even, in the case of most Bedouin villages, removing them altogether. To this end, the government appointed in late 1985 a top-level inter-ministerial commission under the chairmanship of Yaakov Markovitz to study "illegal construction in the Arab sector." The commission, which not surprisingly included no Arabs, submitted its findings, called the "Markovitz Report," in 1986.

"Illegal construction" involves anything built outside the boundaries of the village master plan. All Arab villages and hamlets, which the government refused to recognize as "legal" settlements and which therefore, by definition, lack a master plan, were categorized as "illegal houses" located "outside the master plan." Thus, the term "outside the master plan" not only includes structures outside the designated area for a given village, but a number of entire villages.

The commission recommended expanding the zoning lines of the existing master plans to legalize retroactively most "illegal" buildings in the "legal" or "recognized" villages. On the other hand, all villages and hamlets not

officially recognized by the government (some 40 in the north, and about 20 in the Negev) were termed “grey areas” that were to be demolished within a few years. The Markovitz Report recommended that the owners of “grey houses” be given a grace period of two to five years (depending on the area) for negotiating with the authorities to move to another location and to sell their lands to the state.

The report cites 6,268 “grey houses” and identifies 113 houses for “immediate destruction” throughout Israel. These figures expressly exclude the Northern District, for which figures were to be supplied in a separate report.³⁷ However, the report does list 1,445 demolition orders and an additional 704 illegal houses (principally Bedouin housing) in the Kannana Mountain region and in Fire Zone no. 9 of Central Galilee.³⁸ The commission also marked some 19 “unrecognized” Bedouin villages and hamlets for total demolition within the next four years.³⁹ It should be noted that even the smallest of these villages and hamlets has a greater population than the average-sized Jewish “lookout settlement” established in Galilee.

The unrecognized Bedouin villages and hamlets in Galilee and the Negev are especially threatened by the implications of this report. Their inhabitants have been involved for years in negotiations with the government to have the villages and hamlets recognized, but the state has withheld formal recognition and tried to induce the inhabitants to relocate to other sites chosen by the government. Since 1981, two such villages have completely disappeared because of these pressures, and another three are in the process of dissolution. The choice of site makes government intentions clear: the “planned Bedouin settlements” regroup the Bedouin in such a way that they would not seek livelihood in agriculture or animal husbandry, but as laborers so the urbanized Bedouin become commuting workers employed in the Jewish market,⁴⁰ thus adding a new segment of the Arab population to the reservoir of the landless proletariat being formed in Galilee. The Markovitz Report contributes to this aim by giving the government an “administrative instrument” for rapid implementation of its previous policies, making possible the removal of entire Palestinian villages from areas the government seeks to set aside for present and future Jewish settlement.⁴¹

The implementation of the Markovitz Report’s recommendations became evident as of 1988: 9 houses were demolished in a massive blitz action in the village of Darajat (northeastern Negev) in early May 1988, and 3 houses in Aramshah village (Galilee) in June, 6 houses were demolished in the villages of Ara and Muawiya in July, and 15 houses in Taiyiba (Little Triangle) a week after the Israeli Knesset elections in November 1988. Such demolitions have continued throughout 1989 and 1990. The report also aims to channel future construction activity in the Palestinian villages by increasing housing density within the boundaries of the village master plans and, above all, encouraging Arabs to expand vertically, building multi-storeyed structures, eventually changing the physical morphology of the Palestinian village, lending it an increasingly urban high-rise character. This has long been an objec-

tive desired by government planners as an alternative to the horizontal expansion of village housing units.

Conclusion

The struggle for land between Arab and Jew in the Galilee cannot be considered symmetrical. On the one side stands the state, backed by a monopoly of military power and capital, a legal system, and the option to promulgate new legislation conducive to achieving its objectives. On the other side stands a powerless minority, a community of citizens that has been forced into an intra-state territorial conflict by a policy molded by Zionism, one of the goals of which has been to “place all the lands in the homeland in the hands of the [Jewish] people by having most of the real estate in Israel become the property of the state and the Zionist movement.”⁴² The only option for struggle, however limited, available to the Palestinian side is the legal machinery of the state. Yet even appeals to the High Court of Justice have not served to augment their power. Because of this power asymmetry, the state has been able to transform the settlement landscape of Galilee, penetrating and fragmenting the Palestinian core area. The result of this intensive policy has been the imposition of a new territorial order, and the harmful restructuring of the natural landscape.

Yet the policy of Judaization has not been entirely successful. Not only has it not significantly altered the demographic balance in Galilee, but it has failed to achieve other objectives as well.

First, whereas one of the goals of the Judaization policy has been the definitive and unequivocal demonstration of state sovereignty in Galilee, one of the crucial elements of such sovereignty cited by J. Gottmann as the connecting link between sovereignty and territory—namely, the presence of a people—has not been completely achieved.⁴³ Despite the expropriations and new Jewish settlements, the implanted population has not been settled on the lands in sufficient numbers.

Second, notwithstanding the ongoing process of encroachment on Palestinian lands and their resultant fragmentation, the authorities’ aspirations to place all the land in Palestine under the control and use of the Jewish population in keeping with Zionist ideology have not been met. One result of the Judaization policy is that it has served to unite the region’s Palestinians in their resolute determination to remain on their lands, which they now see as constituting their sole homeland regardless of who exercises sovereign power. Despite all attempts by the state to transfer them and sever their ties with the area, the Arab population has urbanized its villages, at the same time making great efforts to mobilize what remains of their natural resources in order to protect their lands from further encroachment and fragmentation.

Third, the attempt to establish control over the Palestinian population of mountainous Galilee through the model of spatial control based on isolating and fragmenting the territorial continuity of Arab villages has not succeeded.

Despite the fact that the full might of the state, its capital resources, and ideology stand firmly behind the settlement program of Judaization, the presence of the majority Palestinian population in their villages and on their lands, some of which were even expropriated and then leased back to them by the state, is also firm and solid. Thus, two settled populations occupy the same region in sectorial fashion—they are neighbors, but without neighborly relations. Such a situation, in which space is organized along dual lines, is necessarily unhealthy for a “democratic system” over the long term.

These components of Judaization have influenced the urbanization process within Palestinian villages in Israel in general and in Galilee in particular. The dramatic drop in the percentage of agricultural workers in the Arab population from 57.9 percent in 1954 to 10.5 percent in 1985⁴⁴ was a direct result of the “de-Arabization of the soil” rather than the influence of the Israeli labor market. At the same time, the demographical growth of villages and the absence of rural-urban migration have contributed significantly to the list of “urbanized villages” with 5,000 or more inhabitants. In 1951, there were only three towns classified as “urban” in the Northern District (Nazareth, Acre, and Shafa ‘Amr); by the end of 1986, an additional 22 Arab localities had been added to the category of “urbanized village.” Of these, four have a population in excess of 10,000.

Given the policy since 1948 blocking the establishment of any new Arab villages (it should be borne in mind that in the case of the “new” Bedouin settlements which were established, their population was transferred from other existing “nonrecognized” settlements), it is likely that the number of urbanized villages in Galilee will double by the end of the century. Given this reality, the state would be wise to alter structurally its present policy of Judaization in order to encourage social and economic development within the boundaries of the village.

The Palestinians will undoubtedly remain numerically dominant in the region, unless the population is forcibly transferred. Decisionmakers should come to terms with this fact, encouraging a change in the Jewish perception of the Palestinian citizens in Galilee and in the state as a whole, which in turn will facilitate Jewish acceptance of the demographic realities in Galilee. Nonetheless, the massive influx of Russian immigrants to the state, beginning in early 1990, has given the planning and implementation of the Judaization policy in the Galilee a new impetus and demographic justification. Large numbers of such immigrants are being directed to the Jewish development towns of Upper Nazareth, Migdal Ha-emek, Maalot, and particularly Karmiel. The latter town “absorbed” over 2,000 immigrants between March and September 1990, adding some 10 percent to its population. Plans are underway to direct Russian immigrants to the *mitzvim* settlements as well. If immigration continues at the pace forecast by the Zionist authorities over the next five years, the demographic realities can be significantly altered in the Galilee, creating augmented pressure on the Palestinian population and their lands.

NOTES

1. See A. Rokach, *Galilee Development and Settlement* [in Hebrew], (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for Israel, Department of Rural Settlement, 1982), p. 5; A. Soffer, "New Ways for the Settlement of the Mountainous Galilee," in *Horizons in Geography, Proceedings of a symposium held at the University of Haifa, 2-4 June 1981* (Haifa: University of Haifa, 1982), p. 49; and B. Kipnis, "Role and Timing of Complementary Objectives of Regional Policy: The Case of Northern Israel," in *Geoforum* 15 (1984), p. 191.
2. Settlement Study Center, *The Development of Mountainous Galilee* [in Hebrew], (Rehovot: Settlement Study Center, 1978), p. 7.
3. D. Newman, "Ideological and Political Influences on Israeli Urban Colonization of the West Bank and Galilee Mountains," *Canadian Geographer* 28 (1984), pp. 145-46.
4. See B.K. Nijim and B. Muammar, *Toward the De-Arabization of Palestine/Israel 1945-1977*, (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1984).
5. K. Nakhléh, *The Two Galilees*, (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab University Graduates [AAUG], Arab World Issues: Occasional Papers, no. 7, 1982), p. 13.
6. C.S. Kamen, "After the Catastrophe II: The Arabs in Israel, 1948-51," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no.1 (1988), p. 70.
7. For example, see G. Falah, "The Palestinian Exodus: A Geographical Analysis," [in Arabic], (Paper presented at the Second Annual Meeting of Arab Geographers in Israel, Haifa, 11 March 1988).
8. Kipnis, p. 193.
9. C.S. Kamen, "After the Catastrophe I: The Arabs in Israel, 1948-51," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 4 (1987), pp. 478-94; and H. Mossa, "The Geographical Distribution of Arab Homeland Refugees in the Galilee Region," [in Hebrew], (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Haifa, 1988).
10. The figures for 1945 are from S. Hadawi, *Village Statistics 1945*, (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970), pp. 41-77. Figures for 1951 are from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, *Moslems, Christians and Druzes in Israel*, (Jerusalem: Population and Housing Census 1961, publication no. 17, 1964), pp. 102-9.
11. A. Granot, *Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel*, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956), p. 77; A.J. Parkinson, "An Analysis of the Geographical Implications of the Israel-Lebanon Border: the Problems of Settlement in Northern Israel," (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Durham, 1978); and D. Newman, "Civilian Settlement and Military Presence as Alternative Strategies of Territorial Control in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," (Unpublished manuscript, Ben-Gurion University, 1988), p. 17.
12. S. Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), p. 15.
13. See for example, Y. Oded, "Land Losses among Israel's Arab Villagers," *New Outlook* 7, no. 7 (1964), pp. 10-25; S. Jiryis, "The Legal Structure of the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 2, no. 4 (Summer 1973), pp. 82-103; R. Kislev, "Land Expropriations: History of Oppression," *New Outlook* 19, no. 6 (1976), pp. 23-32; E. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); I. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State, Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); and M. Tessler, *Arabs in Israel*, (Hanover, NH: The Wheelock House, American Universities Field Staff Reports, no. 1, 1980), pp. 1-24.
14. Y. Ben-Orath, *The Arab Labor Force in Israel*, (Jerusalem: Maurice Falk Institute, 1966).
15. G. Falah, "The Development of Urban Functions in the Arab Settlements of Central Galilee: A Field Research Report," (Unpublished manuscript, Institute for Development Anthropology, New York). Regarding the delay in Arab industrialization, see also R. Kahmaise, "Industrialization of Arab Villages in Israel," [in Hebrew], (Unpublished MSc thesis, Technion, Haifa).
16. M. Meyer-Brodnitz, "Latent Urbanization in Arab Villages," *Environmental Planning Association Quarterly* 8-9 (1969), pp. 4-12.
17. Ben-Porath, *The Arab Labor Force*; and Kahmaise, "Industrialization of Arab villages."
18. Ministry of Housing, *Induced Urban Development in the Galilee* [in Hebrew], (Tel Aviv: Town Planning Unit, 1977).
19. Jewish Agency, Rural Settlement Department, *The Mountainous Galilee: Proposals for Development* [in Hebrew], (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency, 1974).
20. Jewish National Fund, *Map, Settlement Plan in Mountainous Galilee* (prepared by E. Zimanski) [in Hebrew], (Jerusalem: Department of Education and Youth, 1980).
21. G. Falah, "Arab Al Sawaid Al Kammana is a Link in the Judaization Policy of Galilee," [in Arabic], *Al Mawakib Cultural Magazine* 1, nos. 5-6 (1984), p. 32.
22. Newman, p. 148.
23. Rokach, p. 20.
24. Kipnis, p. 196.
25. E. Efrat, *Geography and Politics in Israel* [in Hebrew], (Tel Aviv: Hotsa at Achiasaf, 1984), p. 196.
26. Falah, "Arab Al Sawaid Al Kammana," pp. 31-39.
27. A. Shmueli and I. Schnell, *Identification and Mapping of a Development Problem in the Arab Sector in Israel*, (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Sapir Center, Discussion Paper no. 5-80, 1980), p. 23.
28. Falah, "The Development of Urban Functions," p. 14.
29. Shmueli and Schnell, p. 23.
30. Falah, "The Development of Urban Functions," p. 16.
31. S. Smootha, "Existing and Alternative Policy towards the Arabs in Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5 (1982), pp. 71-98.
32. Ministry of Housing, p. 76.
33. For example, see S.B. Cohen and L.D. Rosenthal, "A Geographical Model for Political Systems Analysis," *The Geographical Review* 61, no. 1 (1971), p. 11.
34. Ministry of Housing, p. 68.
35. M. Buzi, *Segev 1983-1992: Regional Development Plan*, (Haifa: Jewish Agency for Israel, Settlement De-

- partment, Northern District, publication no. 3-3-83, 1983), p. 16.
36. Buzi, p. 16.
37. *Markovitz Report: Official Report on the "Illegal" Building Activities within the Arab Sector in Israel* [in Hebrew], Jerusalem: unpublished government report, 1986), p. 28.
38. *Markovitz Report*, pp. 28-29.
39. G. Falah, *Pattern of Spontaneous Bedouin Settlement in Galilee*, (Durham: University of Durham, Department of Geography Occasional Publications no. 18, 1983), pp. 48-55.
40. See Falah, "Arab Al Sawaid Al Kammana;" G. Falah, "The Spatial Pattern of Bedouin Sedentarization in Israel," *Geojournal* 11, no.4 (1985); and G. Falah, "Planned Bedouin Settlement in Israel: The Reply," *Geoforum* 16, no.4 (1985).
41. Falah, "Arab Al Sawaid Al Kammana."
42. Granott, p. 140.
43. J. Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, (Charlottesville, VA: University press of Virginia, 1973), p. 4.
44. R. Khalidi, *The Arab Economy in Israel*, (London: Croon Helm, 1988), p. 116